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If You Give a Mouse a Cookie, It’s
Going to Ask for Your Personally
Identifiable Information
A LOOK AT THE DATA-COLLECTION INDUSTRY
AND A PROPOSAL FOR RECOGNIZING THE VALUE
OF CONSUMER INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
Picture yourself in the grocery store walking up and down
the aisles, browsing the shelves in search of the ingredients for
that complicated recipe you found on the Food Network website.
Now picture someone following you, standing right behind you
every step of the way, taking notes on everything you do. You
looked at four brands of sugar but decided that for your key lime
pie, the generic brand would be best (or is it because it is the
cheapest?). You chose three limes that looked less than green, but
they were the biggest ones on the shelf and the sale price was 75
cents per lime. After walking down the candy aisle, you turned
right for paper goods instead of left for frozen foods. Oh, and this
is interesting, you put a package of diapers in your shopping cart.
You must have a baby at home.
If you would find this uncomfortable, you are not alone.
The tailgater is in clear violation of the social norm commonly
referred to as “personal space,”1 which extends at least one and a
half feet from the center of a person’s body.2 Although invasions of
personal space are sometimes an unavoidable fact of everyday life
(e.g., the subway at rush hour), certain impersonal situations,
such as grocery shopping, do not warrant an intrusion into the
invisible bubble that protects individuals from unwanted contact
and interaction. If this idea theoretically protects a grocery store
patron from being followed too closely, what changes when this
activity occurs in the virtual space?
1 See
generally EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966)
(introducing the concept of personal space and “proxemics”).
2 Id. at 112-25.
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The amount of information that exists in virtual space is
almost unfathomable,3 not only to a human being who processes
information in ways other than just 1s and 0s, but even to some
advanced technologies that only understand 1s and 0s. This
incredible amount of data, unmanageable by traditional electronic
data storage systems, is referred to as “Big Data.”4 This data
comes from all over the Internet and contains just about anything
and everything imaginable, including consumer information, user
web activity, and other personal information about individual
Internet users. This information is not just sitting on a computer
somewhere taking up an exorbitant amount of space. On the
contrary, this often personal information is being collected,
deciphered, and sold for enormous sums of money without the
knowledge of the users from whom the information originates5
and without remuneration to these unknowing subjects. Data
brokers provide this collected information to their clients and
have largely managed to remain hidden from public scrutiny.6 As
knowledge of this practice increases, however, data brokers have
experienced more pressure to shed their veils of secrecy and
become officially present as the major market players that they
are. Because the data-collection industry is largely unregulated,
there has been much discussion and debate regarding future
regulation and how best to balance the interests of the market
with the interest of consumers.7
This note examines the lack of regulation and transparency
surrounding the data-collection industry, as well as recent
proposals aimed at alleviating concerns about these regulatory
deficits. It suggests that, to ease tension with consumers, data
brokers should share a portion of the profits that they gain from
3 Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management
Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-themanagement-revolution/ar [http://perma.cc/2ZR4-948Q] (noting that as of 2012, 2.5
exabytes of data were being created daily). One exabyte equals one quintillion bytes—
that’s 1018 bytes. To put this in perspective, no single computer storage system in the
world can hold even close to an exabyte of data. The measurement of an exabyte can
only be used in the context of measuring multiple storage systems. Exabyte Definition,
TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/exabyte [http://perma.cc/RXX6-78NP]
(last updated Dec. 7, 2012).
4 Edd Dumbill, What Is Big Data?, O’REILLY RADAR (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/01/what-is-big-data.html
[http://perma.cc/JB4D-YLV4]
(defining “big data” in terms of the technological capacity to decipher and store).
5 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., A REVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKERS INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING
PURPOSES 5 (Dec. 18, 2013) http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&
File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577 [http://perma.cc/C99L-M24S] [hereinafter
SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE].
6 Id.
7 See infra Part IV.
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distributing consumer information to third parties. This type of
compensation is essential to strengthening the fabric that connects
the data-collection industry to consumers and fundamental notions
of personal integrity, privacy, and self-worth.
Part I of this note introduces the data-collection industry,
including the types and sources of collected information.
Additionally, this Part details the prominent role that data
collection plays in the U.S. market economy and how it has
quickly become a multibillion dollar business.
Part II recognizes the benefits associated with the
presence of data brokers, explains the advantages conferred upon
client companies who enlist the services of data brokers, and
acknowledges the benefits to consumers.
Part III discusses the concerns associated with the
emergence of the data-collection industry, including the lack of
transparency between data brokers and Internet users, privacy
issues, and the pervasiveness of the Internet in a modern world
that is largely dependent on technology. This Part discusses how
these concerns might be addressed while still accounting for the
interests of all relevant parties.
Part IV explores the current state of both federal and state
laws regulating data collection, as well as recent proposals to fill
the regulatory void. In addition, this Part examines applicable
privacy laws as they pertain to electronic storage systems. It also
details the Federal Trade Commission’s past and current roles in
attempting to regulate the data-collection industry and its
possible rule-making position in the future.
In conclusion, Part V introduces a proposal, inspired by the
theory of unjust enrichment, to ease the tension between data
brokers and consumers: data brokers should compensate
consumers for their collected information as a way of recognizing
and legitimizing the information’s value. This Part seeks to
identify why courts have held this idea to be inappropriate, and it
respectfully disagrees, offering an alternative solution involving
consumer compensation. Finally, this Part discusses why it is
important that the data-collection industry recognize value in an
individual’s dossier of personal information and explains how the
proposed solution will strike a balance between data brokers’ and
consumers’ interests.
I.

DATA BROKER? I HARDLY KNOW HER

In order to accurately assess the privacy implications of
widespread data collection, it is first important to understand who
data brokers are, what they do, and how they collect information.
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This Part defines “data brokers” and provides a basic
understanding of how they collect information. It then identifies
the sources from which data brokers collect such information. The
final section discusses the role that data brokers play in the
American economy.
A.

Data Brokers and How They Collect Information

Although there is no statutory definition of the term “data
brokers” (also referred to as information brokers, data
aggregators, and data collectors), the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) defines data brokers as “companies that collect
information, including personal information about consumers,
from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such
information to their customers for various purposes.”8 While the
practice of mass data collection is not new in the United States,9
recent technological developments have transformed the datacollection industry by increasing the ease of access to consumer
information.10 Information that used to take a trip to a library or a
courthouse to find is now easily obtained by a click of a button.11
Data aggregators can find this information with such ease
because all Internet users leave behind a digital footprint.12
An Internet user’s digital footprint is made up of every
single thing the user does on the web.13 Digital footprints
8 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 1 (quoting FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 68 (Mar. 2012)).
9 In 1790, the First Congress conducted the first U.S. census. 1790, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/1790.html
[http://perma.cc/4XYD-FX3E] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015). Every 10 years since then, the
United States Census Bureau has conducted a constitutionally mandated Population and
Housing Census. What We Do, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/about/
what.html [http://perma.cc/GVG5-C3T4] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015). In 1880, the Census
Bureau experienced a premature instance of what is now commonly referred to as
“information overload.” The data compiled for the 1880 census took an unprecedented eight
years
to
tabulate.
Tabulating
and
Processing,
U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/innovations/technology/tabulation_and_processing.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/M8PL-7L6S] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
10 For an incredible real-time website demonstrating just how much technology
has transformed the manner and ease with which we are able to receive information, see
United States Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/
watch/internet-users/region/ [http://perma.cc/S9TY-5NAE] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
11 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 1-2.
12 What
Is a Digital Footprint?, INTERNET SOC’Y (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/flash/What_is_a_Digital_Footprint/
presentation_content/external_files/What_is_a_Digital_Footprint.pdf [http://perma.cc/
ZH6V-HKMC].
13 PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS: ONLINE IDENTITY
MANAGEMENT AND SEARCH IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 2 (2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2007/PIP_Digital_Footprints.pdf.
[http://perma.cc/GN8S-7ZG5] [hereinafter PEW INTERNET]. For an interesting discussion of
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contain public activity, such as posts and comments made on
social media websites, as well as some not so public activity,
such as an archived list of all the terms entered into the Google
search bar.14 Digital footprints are like footprints in the sand.
When people walk along the shore, they leave footprints. These
footprints let others know that someone has been there before
and might possibly reveal information about that person’s
destination. However, “[u]nlike footprints left in the sand at
the beach, . . . online data trails often stick around long after
the tide has gone out.”15 The everlasting quality of the digital
footprint as an enduring source of collectable information
makes it appealing to data brokers.
In addition to the digital footprints that Internet users
leave behind, cookies are one of the most useful tools in the datacollection industry’s repertoire. While these cookies are not the
delicious type that probably come to mind at first blush, they are
equally enticing to data brokers and any entity on the Internet
seeking to collect user information. Cookies are small text files
“used in internet advertising to store website preferences, retain
the contents of shopping carts between visits, and keep browsers
logged into social networking services as individuals surf the
internet.”16 When a user visits a website for the first time, the
website places a cookie on the user’s computer.17 The text file
contains a unique string of letters and numbers, called a namevalue pair, which is used to identify the user when she visits the
webpage in the future; this is called a “first-party cookie.”18
Similarly, a party other than the actual website the user has
visited may place a “third-party cookie” on the user’s computer.19
To illustrate, many websites reserve space for third parties to
advertise on their web pages for a fee. When a user visits a site
like this, the user’s computer will receive a first-party cookie from
the concept of digital footprints and the “shift from the ephemeral to the eternal,” see John
Battelle, From the Ephemeral to the Eternal, JOHN BATTELLE’S SEARCHBLOG (May 6, 2004),
http://battellemedia.com/archives/2004/05/from_the_ephemeral_to_the_eternal.php [http://
perma.cc/CBB7-JZ3L].
14 PEW INTERNET, supra note 13, at 2-3 (“The five most popular search
engines routinely archive a user’s search terms, their computer address, and the
unique identifier for their Web browser for 13-18 months.” (citing CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH., SEARCH PRIVACY PRACTICES: A WORK IN PROGRESS (Aug. 2007))).
15 Id. at i.
16 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp.
2d. 434, 439-40 (D. Del. 2013).
17 Many websites actually place multiple cookies on a user’s computer. But for the
sake of simplicity and ease of explanation, speaking in terms of one cookie is sufficient.
18 In re Google Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d. at 440.
19 Id.
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the host site and a third-party cookie from the entity whose
advertisement appears on the first-party host site.20 Data brokers
collect the information that the third-party cookies gather and
compile this information for their clients in order to “promote
products to consumers more effectively through a [highly]
customized user experience.”21 This is why all of the websites you
visit somehow just know that you are a skier trying to book a trip
to Aspen this coming winter and that you happen to have recently
browsed Gap’s online store for a new coat. Although information
that cookies gather from a user’s computer is often pseudonymized,
meaning this information cannot independently identify an
individual person, there are still very valid and legitimate privacy
concerns associated with the cookie collection method.22
B.

The Categories of Collection

The breadth of information that data brokers collect is
enormous. In December 2012, the FTC conducted a study to
explore the habits of nine major data brokers.23 The study
reported that the companies collect from sources “[that] fall
into three [major] categories: (1) government sources; (2) other
publicly available sources; and (3) commercial sources.”24 All
three categories contain data points that can be associated with
a specific individual’s online and offline presence.

Id.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/
140527databrokerreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQ6S-CCCS] [hereinafter DATA BROKERS].
22 See infra Part III, discussing privacy concerns associated with data collection.
23 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 7. The FTC issued Orders to File Special
Reports to each of the “nine data brokers pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b).” Id. at 3. This section of the Act states in relevant
part that the FTC has the power
20
21

to require, by general or special orders, persons, partnerships, and corporations,
engaged in or whose business affects commerce, . . . to file with the Commission
in such form as the Commission may prescribe annual or special, or both
annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions,
furnishing to the Commission such information as it may require as to the
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other
corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective persons,
partnerships, and corporations filing such reports or answers in writing.
15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006). The nine data brokers that received the Orders are as follows:
Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf, and
Recorded Future. DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 8-9.
24 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 11.
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Information from government sources comes from federal,
state, and local governments.25 This category includes information
from the U.S. census, the social security numbers and dates of
death contained in the Social Security Administration’s Death
Master File, and any professional licenses and motor vehicle
records distributed by states.26 Category two, consisting of other
publicly available sources, contains the bulk of information
obtained.27 This category includes information posted on social
media websites, blogs, and other publicly accessible Internet
forums.28 For example, data brokers can take advantage of online
profiles when users fail to “restrict access to their information.”29
When these profiles are set to “public,” it allows data brokers to
freely collect information associated with the account. Given the
explosion of social media culture in the past decade, one can
imagine the immeasurable amount of collectable data available to
data brokers from the buffet of interactive platforms in existence.
Although it covers arguably the widest range and variety
of information collected, many consumers may fail to realize that
the final category even exists. This category consists of
information gathered from commercial sources, such as “retailers
and catalog companies,” magazine and online subscriptions lists,
purchase lists from financial service companies, and information
that data brokers share with one another.30 For example,
companies and data brokers use store loyalty cards to collect
information about the specific products customers purchase and
how often they purchase them.31 When a customer signs up for a
rewards program, he or she gives out some standard information.
At a minimum, this includes first and last name, possibly an
email address, and maybe a home address and phone number.
Even if the consumer provides only his or her name, that is
enough for the store’s data broker to link the consumer’s real
world and virtual presence.32
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
27 Id.at 13.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 13-14.
31 “Datalogix, . . . which collects information from store loyalty cards, says it has
information on more than $1 trillion in consumer spending ‘across 1400+ leading brands.’”
Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, PROPUBLICA
(June 13, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-aboutwhat-data-brokers-know-about-you [http://perma.cc/MV2K-EUSK]; see SENATE COMMERCE
COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 16.
32 “Datalogix . . . has partnered with Facebook to track whether Facebook users
who see ads for certain products actually end up buying them at local stores . . . .” Beckett,
25
26
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Although “[m]uch of the information [collected in each of
the three categories] is demographic, such as consumers’
names, addresses, telephone numbers, gender, [and] age,”33 a
great deal of the information collected is of the type that an
average person might consider “sensitive” and would ordinarily
take more in-depth investigation to obtain.34 For example,
many data brokers collect health-related information, such as
whether a particular person “uses laxatives or yeast infection
products[, and the number of] OB/GYN doctor visits within the
last 12 months.”35
C.

Data Collection’s Role in the U.S. Economy

In addition to its clear (although often under-the-radar)
presence in daily life, the data-collection industry is quickly
becoming a major player in the U.S. economy.36 In 2012, Professor
supra note 31, at 3. The practice of researching products online before purchasing the same
product in the brick-and-mortar store is referred to as “webrooming.” Mike Cassidy,
Consumers are Harnessing Tech to Return to Stores—Good News or Bad News First?,
WIRED.COM (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/09/webrooming/
[http://perma.cc/7FL8-6G6V]. A Nielsen survey shows that “[w]hen shopping for nonconsumable goods where consumers typically have something in mind, there is mostly a
one-to-one correlation between online searching and shopping.” E-commerce: Evolution or
Revolution in the Fast-Moving Consumer Goods World?, NIELSEN (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2014/e-commerce-evolution-or-revolution-inthe-fast-moving-consumer-goods-world.html [http://perma.cc/T5RA-AKUX].
33 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 13.
34 DATA BROKERS supra note 21, at 13-14 (noting that information concerning
health-related purchases is often collected); see also SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE,
supra note 5, at 14, n.62-64 (noting that at least three major companies collect
information regarding the types of medical conditions that ail certain Internet users).
35 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 14. Furthermore, companies
may utilize data broker services to market to individuals based on the health-related
information obtained. In fact, WebMD’s Privacy Policy states the following:
Third parties under contract with WebMD may use Cookies or Web Beacons
to collect Non-Personal Information about your usage of the WebMD Web
Sites, including which health topics you have viewed. These third party
advertising service providers may use this information to help WebMD
deliver advertising on the WebMD Web Sites as well as on other sites on the
Internet based on your browsing activity on our sites.
WebMD Privacy Policy Summary, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/about-webmdpolicies/about-privacy-policy?ss=ftr [http://perma.cc/4YW6-VCB5] (last visited Dec. 11,
2015) (emphasis added). Based on this language, WebMD may use data brokers to
market to individuals based on the symptoms they input into the WebMD “symptom
checker” or simply health conditions in which the user is interested.
36 JOHN DEIGHTON & PETER A. JOHNSON, THE VALUE OF DATA: CONSEQUENCES
FOR INSIGHT, INNOVATION & EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (2013); DATA BROKERS,
supra note 21, at 23 (showing that one single year of revenue for only nine data brokers
added up to a total of $426,742,795). A preliminary Google search for “data collection
companies usa” yielded almost 300 companies in clicking on just two of the many links
Google returned on the query. GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/search?q=list+

2015]

IF YOU GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE

337

John Deighton of Harvard Business School and Professor Peter A.
Johnson of Columbia University conducted and published a study
revealing that “the data-driven marketing economy [DDME]
represented a minimum of $156 billion in value-added revenues
for services to the U.S. economy.”37 In addition to the
substantial income the DDME generated, it also “supported
approximately 676,000 jobs” in that same year.38 These figures
represent the types of market services “that could not have
been performed without individual-level consumer data
(ILCD),” which includes both pseudonymized information and
personally identifiable information.39
Although data brokers charge their clients pennies for
individual pieces of information, once clients seek multiple data
points for thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals,
the overall cost can easily add up.40 One data broker,
TowerData (formerly RapLeaf), offers 34 different categories of
collectable data points.41 Although each category is worth no
more than $0.01, if a client chooses to collect information from
at least one person in every single category and TowerData
matches each data field to that same individual, the client will
pay TowerData less than $0.50 just for these individual-level
matches.42 For buyers, data is cheap. But the amount of money
that client companies make from this data is exponentially
higher than the minimal cost of purchase.43
of+data+brokers+in+usa&oq=list+of+data+brokers+in+usa&aqs=chrome..69i57.4982j0j7&s
ourceid=chrome&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8#q=data+collection+companies+usa [http://perma.cc/
J8RH-Z2PR] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015). Once on Google.com, the search “data collection
companies” yielded links to, among others, GreenBook.org, which listed 181 results “for
market research firms that offer field collection services,” and Quirk’s.com, which listed 140.
37 DEIGHTON & JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 14 (emphasis added). The authors
of the study note that
[v]alue-added revenues equate to the net amount that producers of goods and
services spend on individual-level data services to find customers for their
offerings, together with associated employment. . . . [They] treat this amount as a
lower bound to the value added to the U.S. economy by the DDME. . . . [They]
make the standard economic assumption that firms spend on inputs until the
marginal cost equals the marginal return. So the surplus value created by the
spending of $156 billion is likely substantially greater than that amount . . . .
Id.

Id.
Id. at 5. ILCD is the type of “information signal that originates with an
individual consumer, or prospective consumer.” Id. at 11.
40
Email Intelligence, a TowerData Solution, TOWERDATA, http://intelligence.
towerdata.com/pricing-append [http://perma.cc/3J2F-8KDW] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
41 Id.
42 Id. This price does not include base services that TowerData charges to clients.
43 Alexis C. Madrigal, How Much Is Your Data Worth? Mmm, Somewhere
Between Half a Cent and $1,200, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:18 PM),
38
39
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THE BENEFITS OF DATA COLLECTION

While much of the negative commentary about data
collection focuses on privacy concerns, it is important to
acknowledge the benefits that the data-collection industry
provides to society as a whole. This Part explores some of the
advantages that data-collection firms bestow upon their client
companies and consumers, a fact that should not be forgotten
when proposing solutions to ameliorate privacy concerns.
A.

Benefits to Client Companies

From a business standpoint, data-collection firms offer
many valuable and innovative solutions to clients. These solutions
can be divided into three main categories: “marketing” products,
“risk mitigation” products, and “people search” products.44
1. Marketing Products
Marketing products “enable . . . clients to create tailored
marketing messages to consumers.”45 These products are further
divided into three subgroups: “direct marketing,” “online
marketing,” and “marketing analytics.”46 Direct marketing
products allow clients to “learn more about their customers” by
“help[ing] . . . fill in gaps that may exist in customer contact
information.”47 The client provides the data broker with some
basic information about the customer, including a name and
address, and the data broker will then provide other information
associated with that customer.48 Additionally, direct marketing
products help “identify consumers who share particular
characteristics”49 (for example, all persons who are female, have
two children, and are licensed attorneys). “The client identifies the
attributes that it would like to find in a consumer audience, and
the data broker provides a list of consumers with those
attributes.”50 This type of information aggregation allows clients to
tailor their marketing campaigns to the consumers that frequently
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/how-much-is-your-data-worthmmm-somewhere-between-half-a-cent-and-1-200/254730/ [http://perma.cc/VR5E-J73L].
44 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 23.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 24.
48 Id. at 25.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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use their products and helps companies reduce marketing directed
at groups that are not regular consumers.51 In employing this
tactic, “[t]he gain in marketing efficiency from avoiding spillover
spending onto uninterested consumers is substantial.”52
Online marketing allows entities to market “to consumers
through the Internet, mobile devices, and cable and satellite
television.”53 Through this medium, companies may display “more
targeted and potentially relevant advertising to consumers.”54
This allows companies to provide a more personalized and
enjoyable online experience for the user. If the consumer likes
what she sees when she logs on to the site, she is more likely to
come back—this means more money and/or exposure for the
client company.55 Data brokers also use online marketing to help
connect a consumer’s online and offline activity by targeting both
existing customers who already use the company’s products and
potential consumers whose existing dossier suggests that they
might be interested in the client’s products.56 Like online
marketing products, marketing analytics products “enable a client
to more accurately target consumers for an advertising campaign,
refine product and campaign messages, and gain insights and
information about consumer attitudes and preferences.”57 Data
brokers assist clients in this way by helping to “model the
expected outcomes of various marketing tactics, thus allowing the
clients to better advertise their products to consumers.”58
2. Risk Mitigation Products
Risk mitigation products allow clients to verify consumer
information, “confirm[] the identity of an individual,” and help
protect against fraudulent activity.59 Some clients use these
products to comply with state and federal laws, such as the USA

51 DEIGHTON & JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 43 (noting that “[t]he goal of
audience targeting is to put digital advertising in front of only the small proportion of
consumers who are very likely to respond to it”).
52 Id.
53 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 26.
54 Id. See also infra, Section II.B, discussing the benefits of targeted
advertising to consumers.
55 Advertisements may be tailored to the location of the user’s computer or to
the user’s specific interests and preferences that the data broker has gathered
elsewhere on the Internet.
56 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 28.
57 Id. at 31.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 32.
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PATRIOT Act60 or the Fair Credit Reporting Act.61 To assist their
clients in confirming consumers’ identities, data brokers offer
“quiz product[s],” which can help add extra layers of identity
verification.62 These types of products are well known and
typically appear when signing up for an online service.63 For
example, if a user decides to pursue online banking, the user will
be prompted to choose from a bevy of “security questions” to
ensure the safety of the account.64 This both protects the user’s
information and guarantees to the bank that the user is in fact who
she says she is. In this same vein, risk mitigation fraud detection
products allow clients to assess the information a consumer
submits and corroborate the reliability of such information.65
3. People Search Products
People search products provide information from publicly
available sources, such as government records and social media
platforms.66 As mentioned in Section I.B, data brokers use
information that is easily obtainable—whether in digital or paper
form—due to its public nature.67 This includes newspaper articles,
online profiles set to “public,” and other documents to which the
public has general access. People search products take these
resources and match personal information about an individual
person or company with other pieces of public information and/or
information already contained in a data broker’s database. These
tools are beneficial to both clients and consumers who utilize
them when searching for a long-lost friend on Facebook or a
potential love interest on Match.com.68

60 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 107
P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272.
61 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 32.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Examples of commonly asked security questions include: “[W]here did you
go to high school? [W]hat is the name of the first street you lived on?” Rebecca J. Rosen,
Security Questions: The Biggest Joke in Online Identity Verification, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7,
2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/08/security-questionsthe-biggest-joke-in-online-identity-verification/260835/ [http://perma.cc/Z7HX-VLLR]. For
an interesting take on what happens when security questions fail to protect consumer
information, see id.
65 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 33.
66 Id. at 34.
67 See supra Section I.B.
68 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 34.
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Benefits to the Consumer

Although data brokers often gear their solutions toward
the client companies, these solutions also afford Internet users
and consumers benefits that may be hidden behind the inherent
suspicion surrounding online data collection.69 Targeted ads
confer a standout advantage on consumers by creating an
enhanced Internet browsing experience.70 In tailoring the ads that
appear on their websites using first- and third-party cookies,
companies are able to offer consumers a more personalized and
enjoyable experience by presenting advertisements and product
suggestions that appeal to individual consumers’ interests.
A company will use the data it has paid for to provide ads
that are “more likely to be relevant (and therefore useful) to [the
consumer].”71 Remember the ski trip you were trying to book? The
banner ads that appear on websites you visit may now show hotel
prices near Aspen and Vail, as well as places offering sales on ski
and snowboard equipment. This type of relevant ad placement
may cause the consumer to have a favorable attitude about the
first-party website hosting the helpful ad and the third-party
website providing the useful and relevant information. Further, it
makes the consumer’s life easier by pointing her in the right
direction to find the products she wants.
Online services also utilize compiled data in order to cater
to their users’ interests. For instance, “Netflix’s video
recommendation feature . . . [demonstrates] how secondary uses
of data can create consumer benefits.”72 The on-demand media
streaming company’s “personalized video recommendation feature
us[es] information that Netflix originally collected” about the
user’s viewing preferences to suggest related titles that are
similar to what the user has previously watched.73 Similarly,
69 See Adam Thierer, Relax and Learn to Love Big Data, U.S.NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 16, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
economic-intelligence/2013/09/16/big-data-collection-has-many-benefits-for-internetusers [http://perma.cc/5HYP-NKDG]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 26, 57 (2012) [hereinafter AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE]; Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 31-34 (2011); Meredith Kile, Need to Know:
How Mobile Data Collection Benefits the Consumer, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:30
PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/techknow/blog/2014/3/13/need-to-knowhowmobiledatacollectionbenefitstheconsumer.html [http://perma.cc/G9AD-B9SH].
70 See Berger, supra note 69, at 16-17 (discussing how targeted ads work
via cookies).
71 Id. at 3, 31-32.
72 AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, supra note 69, at 26.
73 Id. at 57.
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Amazon recommends certain products to consumers based on the
products they have previously browsed or purchased.74
Another benefit that data collection offers to both
consumers and the public at large is the potential for increased
technological innovation. According to one commentator:
Many of the information services and digital technologies
that . . . [society] enjoy[s] . . . came about not necessarily because of some
initial grand design, but rather through innovative thinking after-thefact about how preexisting data sets might be used in interesting new
ways. Some examples include: language translation tools, mobile traffic
services, digital mapping technologies, spam and fraud detection tools,
instant spell-checkers and more.75

The possibilities that can come from this emerging
technology are limitless.76 By purchasing information about
consumer interests and preferences, companies can improve their
products to meet consumer demands. Additionally, consumers can
benefit from the positive impact that this innovation will have on
small businesses. As data collection continues to surge in the
market economy, its availability to local shops will increase. The
places that the consumer already knows and loves will be able to
use data services to further improve the shopping experience for
their loyal patrons. Although consumers often oppose data
collection, it is important to keep these benefits in mind when
balancing the interests of all the parties that data brokers affect.
III.

WAIT A MINUTE, THIS DOESN’T FEEL RIGHT: CONCERNS
ABOUT DATA COLLECTION AND WHY WE SHOULD CARE

Although data brokers offer valuable services to their
clients, there are valid concerns about a practice where the
person about whom information is being collected does not know,
or is only loosely aware, of the existence of such entities and
services. The lack of transparency surrounding the databrokerage industry as a whole raises general concerns about
possible deception and under-the-table practices. Furthermore,
the privacy issue in this context is utterly unavoidable. How far
is too far, and how far are we willing to let data brokers go,

Berger, supra note 69, at 32.
Thierer, supra note 69.
76 See generally Steve Hemsley, Data Collection Gets Innovative, MARKETING
WEEK (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.marketingweek.com/2012/10/10/data-collection-getsinnovative/ [http://perma.cc/RQK3-G9WF] (noting innovative new ways to use
consumer data).
74

75
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particularly in light of the Internet’s pervasive presence in
modern life, before society collectively says, “enough”?
A.

Lack of Transparency

The crux of the transparency concern is that data brokers
harvest and obtain information without the consumer’s
knowledge or explicit consent, and consumers are largely
unaware of the type of information being collected and
disseminated. “Data brokers generally are not consumer facing,
therefore, most consumers have no way of knowing that data
brokers may be collecting their data.”77 This lack of transparency
creates an intrinsic distrust between data brokers and consumers.
First of all, many people are still unaware of the existence of data
brokers, and for people who are aware, they are unfamiliar with
the extent of information that is collected or how it is used.78
“Because users are not generally aware of . . . [data
brokers’] methods of collection and distribution, many feel
insecure about surfing the web. This anxiety increases every
time the media reports stories extolling the dangers of personal
information that has been bought, sold or stolen.”79 As far as
ignorance being bliss, in this scenario, such ignorance, when
perpetuated by the data brokers themselves, is unfair and
unacceptable to the consumers from whom they are profiting so
handsomely. No one likes to have the wool pulled over their
eyes; no one likes to feel like they are being deceived. And when
consumers find out that the companies they have been so loyal
to for years have essentially talked behind their backs and
spread their information to third parties, it is in that moment
that they lose trust in those companies.
As discussed in the next Part, the FTC is engaged in
somewhat of a crusade to remedy this lack of transparency.80
77

SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 32.

78

Data brokers acquire a vast array of detailed and specific information about
consumers; analyze it to make inferences about consumers, some of which
may be considered sensitive; and share the information with clients in a
range of industries. All of this activity takes place behind the scenes, without
consumers’ knowledge.
DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at vii.
79 David Goldman, I Always Feel Like Someone Is Watching Me: A Technological
Solution for Online Privacy, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 353, 369 (2006).
80 See DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 3-7; see also infra Part IV (discussing
the FTC’s role in proposed regulation of the data-collection industry); Press Release,
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Data Brokers with Helping Scammer Take
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Although clearly easier said than done, one way to remedy a
situation like this is to ensure that people are informed. Consumers
should know that their data is collected in the first place, and they
should also know what is done with that information. When
consumers are properly informed, they can form more educated
opinions and are better suited to advocate for themselves.
B.

Privacy

When it comes to criticizing data collection, the issue of
privacy is quite possibly the most popular hot-button topic—
this is what everyone is talking about. When people first learn
about data brokers, their instant reaction is almost always one
of incredulity. They next deliver a monologue about how that
has got to be in violation of some privacy law.81 The privacy
concern in this context is a loaded one that numerous scholars
have addressed in different and nuanced ways.82
The heart of the privacy issue is that there is something
unsettling and wrong about a stranger knowing so much about
another person’s life without permission to be privy to that
information. The stranger can piece together a cohesive picture
of an individual’s life by compiling hundreds of data points that
are recorded about any given person. “Individually, each of these
More Than $7 Million from Consumers’ Accounts (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2015/08/ftc-charges-data-brokers-helping-scammer-take-more-7million [http://perma.cc/AJ92-S4S3] (detailing a recent charge brought by the FTC
against Sequoia One, LLC, Gen X Marketing Group, LLC, and several of the companies’
owners, operators, and managers, for scamming payday loan applicants and “debiting
their bank accounts and charging their credits cards without their consent”).
81 While writing this note, I spoke to many people regarding data brokers,
including family, friends, peers, and professionals. Many were unaware of data brokers’
existence. Some were aware of their existence but did not have a detailed picture of
exactly what data brokers do. The reaction mentioned above is the one I received
during almost every conversation.
82 For a more in-depth look at privacy as it relates to data brokers, see Robert
Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying
Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91
(2009) (discussing the lack of protections offered by the existing legal privacy regime and
proposing the enactment of stronger laws to meet that end); Goldman, supra note 79, at 357
(suggesting that the best way to alleviate Internet privacy concerns is to combine aspects of
various systems to create a “hybrid solution that allows individuals and marketers to work
together to determine their own value for personal information”); James P. Nehf,
Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003)
(arguing that “information privacy should be viewed as a societal value justifying a
resolution in the public interest, much like environmental policy and other societal concerns,
with less emphasis on individual self-policing and market-based mechanisms”); Alexander
Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433 (2014) (comparing U.S. privacy laws to the European Union’s
heavily regulated privacy regime and further suggesting that the European Union’s
approach is more favorable for protecting personal privacy and dignity).
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pieces of personal information represents a mere pixel of
[someone’s] life, but when pieced together, they present a rather
detailed picture of [that person’s] identity.”83 This mosaic effect
of data compilation leaves people feeling violated and anxious
about who knows what and how much. Targeted ads also rub
many people the wrong way. Even if companies contend that
targeted ads will enhance a consumer’s online experience, this
still, for lack of a better phrase, “creeps out some people who see
it as an invasion of their privacy.”84
The first time I saw a targeted ad some years ago, I did
not know what I was seeing or how it worked. I was confused,
impressed by the extrasensory machine that I was apparently
using, and also puzzled as to why and how the sidebar of the
Pandora music player was displaying my latest online shopping
purchase. You have to admit the strange feeling when targeted
ads show up on an unrelated webpage—a “how did you know that
when I did not tell you” sort of feeling that is off-putting and odd.
When it comes to their online presence, people are not
necessarily concerned about privacy because they have something
to hide. Rather, when an unauthorized entity has the ability to
obtain information that a person has not willingly divulged, the
principle of privacy and security in one’s person and online
information is disregarded. In this sense, there is a “loss of
dignity, autonomy, . . . [and] respect for the individual that results
when we lose control over personal information.”85 During her
keynote address at the 23rd Annual Computers, Freedom, &
Privacy Conference, Julie Brill, Commissioner of the FTC asked:
[W]hat damage is done to our individual sense of privacy and
autonomy in a society in which information about some of the most
sensitive aspects of our lives is available for analysts to examine
without our knowledge or consent, and for anyone to buy if they are
willing to pay the going price[?]86

83 Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 82, at 95 (quoting Corey A. Ciochetti, ECommerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal Information
Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 56 (2007)).
84 Jim Puzzanghera, Tough Cookies for Web Surfers Seeking Privacy, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/19/business/fi-privacy19
[http://perma.cc/K3LE-L9WV].
85 Nehf, supra note 82, at 70.
86 Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 23rd
Computers Freedom and Privacy Conference: Reclaim Your Name (June 26, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/reclaim-your-name/
130626computersfreedom.pdf [http://perma.cc/87MK-NF4V] (noting concerns about the fact
that much of the health information that data brokers collect falls outside the stringent
protections of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)).
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The framing of this question makes it apparent that
even the FTC Commissioner is uncomfortable with the way the
data-collection industry treats consumer privacy.
C.

Pervasiveness

There is also a concern that data brokers might be taking
advantage of the widespread and pervasive nature of the Internet,
which has come to be a staple of modern life. The number of
Internet users in the United States increases by approximately one
user per second.87 Currently, there are over 302,050,870 Internet
users in the United States,88 a country with a population of about
321.6 million.89 This means that about 94% of people in the
United States use the Internet. Some argue that to participate
fully and take advantage of modern, innovative society, one must
have Internet access. Indeed, some courts have already
recognized the indispensable nature of computer and Internet
access in our modern world.90 President Barack Obama has gone
so far as to implore regulatory agencies to recognize that for most
Americans, “the Internet has become an essential part of everyday
communication and everyday life,”91 emphasizing that “[t]oday[,]
high-speed . . . [Internet] is not a luxury, it’s a necessity.”92
Furthermore, to accommodate commercial transactions
both online and offline, businesses must ask individuals to submit
some amount of personally identifiable information.93 Simply by
“participating in the Internet economy, consumers lose control
over which details about their private lives are known, and they
have little control over who gets to learn of these details after the
data passes into a profiler’s hands.”94 Are data-collection agencies
taking advantage of the fact that people have little to no choice
See United States Internet Users, supra note 10.
Id.
89 U.S.
and
World
Population
Clock,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ [http://perma.cc/7VAM-232B] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
90 Pollard v. Superior Cmty. Credit Union, 306 B.R. 637, 645 n.5 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2004); Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns, Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Ky. 2012)
(Schroder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[i]n the digital
age in which we now live, internet access is becoming more and more of a necessity for
personal communication, as well as for business and commerce purposes”).
91 Dashiell Bennett, Obama: The Internet Is a Utility, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10,
2014, 10:32 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/obamainternet-utility-fcc-regulation-net-neutrality/382561/ [http://perma.cc/W7NF-925G].
92 Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Says High-Speed Broadband Is a Necessity, Not a
Luxury, DENVER POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_27322556/
obama-says-high-speed-broadband-is-necessity-not [http://perma.cc/F3TW-NHBA].
93 Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 82, at 93.
94 Berger, supra note 69, at 19 (internal citation omitted).
87

88

2015]

IF YOU GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE

347

but to reveal their information on the Internet? Is it reasonable to
allow the collection of this information simply because it is there
anyway? While some companies offer opt-out options for data
collection, many “make opting out as cumbersome as possible”
and fail to fully inform users about how their data is being used.95
“As a result, very few people opt-out, and those who try find the
process difficult and time-consuming.”96
In the case of In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation, a
district court in the Southern District of New York skirted the
issue of the necessary and unavoidable submission of information
when it held that online advertising company Doubleclick was
authorized to access plaintiff-users’ “GET, POST, and GIF
submissions to Doubleclick-affiliated Web sites” because these
submissions were voluntary and purposeful.97 As an online
advertising company, “Doubleclick creates value for its customers
in large part by building detailed profiles of Internet users and
using them to target clients’ advertisements.”98 In order to show
the targeted advertisements to the user, Doubleclick uses cookies
to collect information about a users’ web activity. These cookies
collect “information in three ways: (1) ‘GET’ submissions, (2)
‘POST’ submissions, and (3) ‘GIF’ submissions.”99 While GET and
POST submissions consist of voluntarily provided information,
such as terms in a search query or information provided when
signing up for an online newsletter, GIF submissions track the
movement of a user’s mouse on a particular website.100 Although
mouse movements are certainly voluntary, one wonders how else
a person could possibly browse a website without moving the
mouse. Even if it were possible, GIF submissions track the
cursor’s movement all the same. Just because I voluntarily move
my mouse does not mean I have authorized anyone to track that
movement. Here lies the tension between society’s inescapable
need for the Internet and the individual’s desire to maintain
online privacy.

95 Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 369 (2006).
96 Id.
97 In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
98 Id. at 502 (internal citation omitted).
99 Id. at 504.
100 Id.
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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND ITS KEY PLAYERS

It is important to recognize that whatever qualms exist
with the data-collection industry, it is certainly here to stay.
There are discernible benefits to all parties involved, and the
positive impact on the economy is prevalent.101 Extinguishing
data brokers would cut off the head of a profitable and
strengthening force—but this is not to say that the industry is
entitled to operate with unfettered discretion. As with all things
worth protecting, there must be a balance between the various
interests at stake. To date, there are very few laws in place to
regulate data brokers, the way data is collected, or how data is
used.102 This Part recognizes the key players involved in proposing
regulations for the industry and supports several proposals that
achieve a favorable balance among all interested parties.
A.

The Federal Trade Commission

The regulation of data brokers is almost nonexistent.103
The privacy laws under which data brokers currently operate
have an extremely limited scope, and consumers’ rights are
largely unprotected, as there are “[n]o overarching federal
privacy law[s] govern[ing] the collection and sale of personal
information among private-sector companies.”104 Furthermore,
consumers have no control over what information data brokers
collect and no ability to correct inaccuracies in the collected
data.105 The FTC has led the effort to regulate the data-collection
industry. The FTC’s basic mission is twofold.106 First, it seeks to
“protect[ ] consumers by stopping unfair, deceptive or fraudulent
practices in the marketplace.”107 To this end, the FTC “conduct[s]
investigations, . . . [initiates lawsuits against] people [and
companies] that violate the law, [and] develop[s] rules to ensure
a vibrant marketplace.”108 Second, the FTC promotes fair

See DEIGHTON & JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 18, 23-25.
SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 26.
103 Id.
104 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION RESELLERS: CONSUMER
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE
MARKETPLACE
intro.
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658151.pdf
[http://perma.cc/992Y-6L8L] [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
105 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 3.
106 What We Do, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-wedo [http://perma.cc/HAQ6-DMUX] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
107 Id.
108 Id.
101

102

2015]

IF YOU GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE

349

competition by enforcing antitrust laws and ensuring that the
markets remain truly free and open.109
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act gives the
FTC rulemaking authority with regard to various areas of
consumer protection, including privacy, and allows the
Commission to impose sanctions and seek monetary redress on
behalf of consumers.110 Many of the FTC’s rulings and orders
are considered legally binding, and Congress has authorized
the majority of the regulations the FTC has published in the
last two to three decades.111
In December 2012, the FTC conducted a study to gain
insight into data broker practices.112 In furtherance of its
mission, the FTC issued Orders to File Special Reports under
the FTC Act113 to nine data brokers,114 seeking answers to basic
questions about the way each company collects, uses, and sells
data.115 In this and subsequent investigations, the FTC
consistently called for increased transparency and regulation of
the data-collection industry.116 This call for transparency comes
in the wake of the obvious surge in technological and societal
progress and the concern that this progress will compromise
individual privacy unless the law finds a way to catch up.117
In 2014, the FTC published another report calling for
data broker transparency.118 In this report, the Commission
called on data brokers to adopt several “best practices to
improve the transparency of the data broker industry.”119 First,
the FTC suggested
privacy-by-design, which includes considering privacy issues at every
stage of product development. Second . . . [it] encourages data brokers to
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).
111 JOHN A. SPAGNOLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (West
Publishing Co., 4th ed. 2013).
112 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 7.
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 46 (b) (2012) for the relevant portion of the Federal Trade
Commission Act allowing the Commission to require certain business entities to
respond to specific inquiries regarding “organization, business, conduct, practices,
management, and relation [to other business entities].”
114 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 7-9.
115 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at ii. “The Committee’s
inquiry sought answers to four basic questions: What data about consumers does the
data broker industry collect? How specific is this data? How does the data broker
industry obtain consumer data? Who buys this data and how is it used?” Id.
116 See DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 4-5, 33; see also AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE, supra note 69, at 60-72 (discussing the FTC’s proposal to increase data broker
transparency through privacy notices, access, and consumer education).
117 DATA BROKERS, supra note 21, at 5.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 6.
109
110
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implement better measures to refrain from collecting information
from children and teens, particularly in marketing products. Finally,
the Commission recommends that data brokers take reasonable
precautions to ensure that downstream users of their data do not use it
for eligibility determinations or for unlawful discriminatory purposes.120

It is the FTC’s hope that these measures will help ease the
tension between data brokers and consumers and create a more
stable legal environment where there is a clearer delineation of
what is acceptable and unacceptable.121
B.

The Government Accountability Office

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also
actively involved in the discussion about how to regulate the
data-brokerage industry. In 2013, the FTC asked the GAO to
“review the privacy laws applicable to consumer information
collected and sold for marketing purposes.”122 Upon review, the
GAO found that “[w]ith regard to data used for marketing, no
federal statute provides consumers the right to learn what
information is held about them and who holds it.”123 It also found
that “consumers . . . do not have the legal right to control the
collection or sharing with third parties of sensitive personal
information (such as their shopping habits and health interests)
for marketing purposes,”124 and “no comprehensive federal
privacy law governs the collection, use, and sale of personal
information by private-sector companies.”125
According to the GAO, few federal laws are sufficiently
related in some way to consumer privacy,126 and even fewer
state laws touch on consumer privacy.127 Of the relevant federal
laws, the GAO did not find any that were specifically on point
with current data-collection methods, sources, and types. It
found that “the scope of current federal privacy laws is limited
in addressing the methods by which, or the sources from which,
Id. at ix.
Id. at vii.
122 SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 3.
123 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at intro.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 7.
126 Id. The GAO makes special mention of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, HIPAA, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Telecommunications Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Id. at 8-14.
Although all of these federal acts address consumer privacy protection in one way or
another, they are narrowly tailored and apply to very specific circumstances. Id. at 7.
127 Id. at 14.
120

121
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information resellers and private-sector companies collect and
aggregate personal information, or the types of information
that may be collected for marketing or look-up purposes.”128
Furthermore, “[t]he current privacy framework does not fully
address new technologies[,] . . . such as social media, web
tracking technologies, and mobile devices[, that] have enabled
even cheaper, faster, and more detailed data collection and
sharing among resellers and private-sector companies.”129
As for state laws, the GAO found that California, Utah,
Massachusetts, and Nevada all have laws that address the issues
with which the FTC and GAO are concerned. “California’s Shine
the Light law requires certain businesses to disclose, upon a
California customer’s request, whether those businesses have
shared the customer’s personal information with third parties for
direct marketing purposes.”130 Utah has a similar law requiring
“commercial entities to disclose to consumers the types of
nonpublic personal information shared with or sold to third
parties for compensation.”131 Both Massachusetts and Nevada
“have laws or regulations requiring businesses to safeguard and
encrypt personally identifiable consumer data.”132 In assessing the
minimal findings in both federal and state law, the GAO
determined that there are indeed gaps in both federal and state
privacy law schemes and suggested a baseline framework that
would help fill in those gaps on a federal level, allowing states to
fill in the rest.133 At a minimum, what the federal government
should guarantee to consumers is a level of privacy on par with the
values and social norms reflective of a twenty-first-century society.
C.

Proposed Legislation

In March 2015, four U.S. Senators introduced the Data
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act),134
which calls upon the FTC to promulgate concrete rules for data
128
129
130
131

(West 2003).

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 15; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (effective Jan. 1, 2005).
GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 15; see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -203

132 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 15; see 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 to
17.05 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 to .920 (2011).
133 GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 31-33.
134 Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 668, 114th Cong.
(2015) (introduced in the Senate on March 4, 2015); John M. Simpson, Consumer Watchdog
Backs Senate Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, CONSUMER WATCHDOG
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-backssenate-data-broker-accountability-and-transparency-act [http://perma.cc/T9G5-CPCP].
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collection. The DATA Act would require all data brokers to
“maintain an Internet website and place a clear and conspicuous
notice on the Internet website”135 with instructions for how
individuals can review personal information previously collected
or assembled by the data broker and how to express a preference
with respect to the use of personal information for marketing
purposes.136 Under the Act, individuals would have an automatic
right to access information that data brokers collect about them.137
Upon request, data brokers must grant an individual access to
any personal information that the data broker has collected about
him or her and allow the individual to correct any information that
may be inaccurate.138 Perhaps the most satisfying requirement for
those who find tailored online advertisements unfavorable, the
DATA Act obligates any data broker that collects personal
information and “uses, shares, or sells that information for
marketing purposes” to provide data subjects “with a reasonable
means of expressing a preference not to have . . . [their]
information used for those purposes.”139 This opt-out mechanism
is extremely important for building a relationship of trust
between data brokers and consumers. This section of the Act,
however, provides an opt-out mechanism only for the specific
activities and purposes mentioned. The language of the Act
implicitly gives data brokers permission to collect information for
other purposes, and it provides no further opportunity to opt out.140
Giving individuals choices about what information
about them (if any) is collected would alleviate at least some
concerns about the lack of transparency in the data-collection
industry. The DATA Act has been referred to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and awaits further
review. But despite the widespread public interest group
support for the bill,141 govtrack.us has determined that there is
only a four percent chance of its enactment.142 This strikingly
low number is unfortunate given the implications if the bill is
135 Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 668, 114th Cong.
§ 4(d)(1) (2015).
136 Id.
137 Id. § 4(b)(1).
138 Id. § 4(f)(1).
139 Id. § 4(e). It is worth noting that many companies not considered data
brokers allow users to access and correct any personal information that the company
may have pursuant to an online privacy policy or similar engagement form.
140 Id. § (e)(f)(2).
141 Simpson, supra note 134.
142 S. 688: Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s668 [http://perma.cc/GD8SY5M2] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
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passed.143 Its provisions would change the face of the databrokerage industry and help alleviate many concerns expressed
by government agencies and consumers alike.
The need for regulation of the data-collection industry
cannot be stressed enough. Regulation that comports with the
FTC’s aims would create the transparency and accountability
that the various state and federal agencies seek to achieve. Any
regulations or legislation must account for all of the interests
at stake. Successful propositions will strike a balance between
consumer and industry needs; to this end, measures must be
reasonable. These measures must keep pace with the rapid and
constant technological change in this country in order to ensure
that technology and the law do not collide, stifling one
another’s progress.
V.

SHOW ME THE MONEY: A PROPOSAL TO EASE THE
TENSION BETWEEN DATA BROKERS AND CONSUMERS

There is little doubt that the recent proposals for
targeted regulation of the data-collection industry are giant
leaps forward in the otherwise wild west-type landscape that
currently exists. These promising steps signal a positive move
toward easing the tensions between data brokers, consumers,
and other interested parties. Notwithstanding this progress,
these bills remain stagnant in Congress and have a
depressingly low chance of enactment.144 Luckily, there may be
another way to ease this tension: compensate consumers for
their data.
If the strain between data brokers and consumers is to be
truly alleviated, it is imperative that consumers—the individuals
who by their own virtual and physical presence create the
mountains of information that are worth billions of dollars a year
to data brokers—feel like they are being treated fairly.
Relationships are about compromise, and it seems that data
brokers are doing far more taking than giving. Instead of being
rewarded and compensated for their obviously valuable
assistance, consumers feel uninformed and deceived by data
brokers’ conduct. Every single mouse click, URL entry, and
Google search goes into creating consumers’ valuable profiles. It is
the consumer’s existence that fuels the data-collection industry—
143 According to govtrack.us, “only 15% of bills made it past committee and only
about 3% were enacted in 2013–2015”—statistics that do not bode well even for bills with
chances of enactment many times higher than that of the DATA Act. Id.
144 See supra Section IV.C.
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without them, data brokers have nothing to collect and nothing to
sell. A system of compensation, whether monetary or otherwise,
would strengthen this relationship and allow for balance between
data brokers’ business interests and consumers’ and society’s
interests in integrity, privacy, and self-worth.
Many plaintiffs have turned to courts with a similar
thought in mind.145 A common claim brought in this context is
that of unjust enrichment. Although elements of an unjust
enrichment claim may vary from state to state,146 “[t]he pivotal
concept of unjust enrichment is the occurrence of a wrong or
something unjust. The mere fact that a defendant may have
benefitted from the plaintiff’s action alone is insufficient to
grant relief . . . ; it must be shown that the defendant’s
enrichment is unjust.”147 An unjust enrichment claim is a
common theory of liability in contract law and is thought of as
a quasi-contract claim.148 Courts have largely ignored unjust
enrichment claims in relation to data collection and claims
alleging that data collectors should compensate Internet users
for their personal information.
In the case of In re Nickelodeon,149 a class of plaintiffs
consisting of children under the age of 13 alleged that
defendants Viacom and Google violated their privacy rights by
placing both first- and third-party cookies on their computers
without either their consent or the consent of their parents.150
These cookies allowed defendants to collect information about
the children’s identities and Internet activity and compile this
information with previously gathered data.151 In their
complaint, the plaintiffs contended that personal information is
valuable.152 They stated that “[t]he value of the information
that Defendants take from people who use the Internet is well
known . . . . Personal information is now viewed as a form of
currency.”153 The district court for the District of New Jersey
145 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp.
2d 434 (D. Del. 2013); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 2443 (SRC), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91286 (D.N.J. 2014); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379
F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
146 See 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 11 (outlining the
different approaches that states take with respect to pleading unjust enrichment).
147 42 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM IMPLIED CONTRACTS § 9 (footnote omitted);
N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 4:12.
148 In re Nickelodeon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91286, at *18-20.
149 Id.
150 Id. at *6-10.
151 Id.
152 Id. at *14.
153 Id.
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declined to agree with this proposition, noting that even if the
plaintiffs’ claim about the value of personal information was
true, “it does not follow that personal information of the type
collected by Viacom and Google has actual monetary value to
Plaintiffs themselves.”154 In proffering this analysis, the court
overlooked the crucial fact that without individuals like the
class of plaintiffs at bar, Google, Viacom, and similar
companies would have no data to collect at all.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ contentions, the court drew an
interesting comparison, stating that the plaintiffs’ claim was
“indistinguishable from the belief that a football fan could sell
her eyeballs to a TV network for four cents because an
advertiser pays $4 million to reach 100 million viewers during
the Super Bowl.”155 With all due respect to the court and its
opinion, these acts are simply not comparable. Once one’s
eyeballs are sold, the consumer, who can no longer use his
ocular sense, is a useless consumer to the TV network. On the
contrary, an Internet user is a perpetual source of income for
data brokers. A single individual’s data set can be sold a
limitless number of times to as many people as are willing to
pay for it. The only thing that would stop a user from creating
collectable data in such a permanent way as removing one’s
eyeballs would be to ensure that said user never accessed a
computer and never left his or her house. It is essential that
courts recognize this symbiosis and acknowledge it as unique
from a typical consumer-business relationship.
The Nickelodeon “[p]laintiffs argue[d] that . . . [Google and
Viacom] ‘received a direct benefit’ from the information they
collected from [the plaintiffs].”156 This would appear to be a rather
accurate statement of what occurred. The defendant companies
undoubtedly benefitted from the plaintiffs’ information. The court,
however, interpreted unjust enrichment to “require[ ] that the
plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the defendant
at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and
that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its
contractual rights.”157 When analyzing the plaintiffs’ claim, the
court stated that a
receipt of a benefit by a defendant and conferral of a benefit by a
plaintiff are two different things, and it simply is not reasonable for
154
155
156
157

Id. at *15.
Id. at *14-15.
Id. at *70.
Id. at *69 (quoting VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d. 519 (N.J. 1994)).
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a consumer—regardless of age—to use the Internet without charge
and expect compensation because a provider of online services has
monetized that usage.158

Looking at the Internet in this way is a dangerous
game. To say that data brokers can do whatever they want
with online information simply because the Internet is a “free”
service (which may not necessarily be the case) and the user
already benefits by using the service in the first place would
open the door to a flood of adverse online activity from which
users should be protected—even if the service is free.
Despite the various studies on the value of data and the
clear market value of the data-collection industry,159 courts have
been unwilling to recognize that personal information has an
enhanced monetary value when in the hands of a data broker.160
In re Google addressed the defendants’ usage and placement of
first- and third-party cookies on its site and affiliated sites. The
plaintiffs brought suit because they were unhappy about the
targeted ads showing up on their Internet browsers and believed
that defendant companies tricked their “browsers into accepting
cookies, which then allowed defendants to display targeted
advertising.”161 The court found that the plaintiffs did not plead
facts sufficient to show that they had sustained an injury in fact as
a result of the defendants’ data collection.162 Although the plaintiffs
“offered some evidence that the online personal information at
issue ha[d] some modicum of identifiable value to an individual
plaintiff,” they “[did] not sufficiently allege[] that the ability to
monetize their PII ha[d] been diminished or lost by virtue of
Google’s previous collection of it.”163 Similarly, in LaCourt v.
Specific Media, Inc., the fact that a third party collected the
plaintiffs’ personal information was not enough to establish that
the plaintiffs were deprived of some economic value.164
It makes little sense that when a third party collects a
person’s data and sells it for a profit, the act is not sufficient to
show that that the third party has deprived the individual of
that data’s value. It also seems somewhat intuitive that a
person should be paid for the use of his or her creation,
Id. at *70.
See supra Section I.C; DEIGHTON & JOHNSON, supra note 36.
160 See In re Google Cookie Placement Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d. 434
(D. Del. 2013).
161 Id. at 439.
162 Id. at 442.
163 Id. (internal citation omitted).
164 LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. 10-1256-GW (JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50543, at *12 (2011).
158

159
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especially when that person has already done the hard part of
making something out of nothing. There should be a way to
compensate this creator. Like a shareholder’s dividend, data
brokers could pay consumers at year’s end for the relative
value of their information. Although this amount may end up
being very little,165 it is much more about the principle—
individuals playing an active role in how others use their
information as opposed to being passively taken advantage of—
than being paid a handsome profit. Alternatively, data brokers
could offer special benefits, such as coupons or vouchers for
products or services in which that consumer has an interest.
The consumer would benefit from the data broker’s tailored
product suggestions, and the data broker would continue to
profit from selling the consumer’s information. In fact, an
interesting experiment conducted at a Brooklyn arts festival
determined that consumers were significantly more likely to
give up personal information if they had an incentive.166 Like
the saying goes, you catch more flies with honey.167
It is also unclear why the law provides protections in
copyright and intellectual property for original works and
expressions but declines to protect unique lists of information
that are just as personal and identifiable as a musical
composition or the manifestation of an idea on paper. This is
not to say that an entirely new legal right or cause of action
need be created; however, it is important to recognize, at the
very least, that individuals think about their personal
165 Emily Steele et al., How Much Is Your Personal Data Worth?, FIN. TIMES
(June 12, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b-11e2-88ed00144feab7de.html [http://perma.cc/5XEN-5DFU] (noting that “[t]he average person’s
data often retails for less than a dollar”).
166 Lois Beckett, How Much of Your Data Would You Trade for a Free Cookie?,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-ofyour-data-would-you-trade-for-a-free-cookie [http://perma.cc/4RZP-PZFV]. In this piece
of performance art turned social experiment, entitled “Please Enable Cookies,” artist
Risa Puno offered 380 New Yorkers fresh baked cookies in exchange for their personal
information. Puno asked for things like name, address, phone number, and driver’s
license number. Out of those 380 people, almost half were willing to give more sensitive
information, such as the last four digits of their Social Security number. One-third
were willing to have their fingerprints taken.
167 Omar Tene and Jules Polonetsky, two prominent figures in the field of
online privacy, have suggested a similar framework for recognizing the value of an
individual’s information whereby companies share with individuals the information
they have about them in a “‘useable format’” that would “allow[ ] them to take
advantage of third party applications to analyze their own data and draw useful
conclusions.” Omar Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data For All: Privacy and User
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 239, 264 (2013). This
framework would allow users to create value from their information as opposed to
receiving a monetary payout from the company itself. Id.
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information as something in which they have an interest.
According to one commentator,
It is likely too late to suggest that consumers actually do own their
information, and that we should, therefore, analyze the rights of
profilers based on a concept of a license to use the data. Nonetheless,
the best solutions in this area must accommodate the concept that
consumers think of personal information as their property, and their
privacy and ownership expectations reflect this.168

At present, a startup called Datacoup provides a service
in which registered users can receive cash in exchange for
access “to a combination of their social media accounts, such as
Facebook and Twitter, and the feed of transactions from a
credit or debit card.”169 The company “believe[s] that everyone
has valuable data” and allows people to capitalize on that
data.170 This type of initiative presents an example of a
compensation structure in real time, and its implementation is
significant. By offering to pay participants for their data, it
solidifies the notion that one’s personal information is indeed
valuable. The compensation scheme then gives back to the
consumer for providing the information, which the company
has already recognized as valuable. Furthermore, Datacoup
exemplifies how private citizens and companies can come
together to solve problems independently of legislatures and
outside of the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
As technology continues to develop, society must face
new and different social and legal issues. The existence of data
brokers and data-collection companies raise these issues. The
privacy concerns surrounding data collection will not
disappear, and unless specific measures are taken, the databrokerage industry will continue to operate unregulated. It is
imperative to address these concerns to prevent them from
spinning out of control and setting a laissez-faire precedent.
While no problem can be solved overnight, one step
toward filling the regulatory gap is for data brokers to publicly
acknowledge the fact that consumers and Internet users are
Berger, supra note 66, at 60 (internal citation omitted).
Tom Simonite, Sell Your Personal Data for $8 a Month, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb.
12, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/524621/sell-your-personal-data-for-8-amonth/ [http://perma.cc/L9QL-TKZL]; How It Works, DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com/
docs#how-it-works [http://perma.cc/5CQ9-9SAA] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
170 DATACOUP, supra note 169.
168

169
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not only an integral part of their business, but a necessary
part, as well. The value of collected information cannot be
overstated. Data collection’s tremendously positive impact on
the U.S. economy, as well as the fact that data brokers sell
collected information for a substantial profit, demonstrates how
lucrative consumer information really is. Compensating
consumers for their information would certainly signal data
brokers’ acknowledgement not only of the monetary value of
personal information, but also of the intrinsic value of a dossier
of information that conjures up a near complete image of an
individual’s life.
Legislatures and courts must take proactive steps to
address the various concerns surrounding the data-collection
industry and develop real solutions recognizing that all
interested parties have different yet equally important rights
worth protecting. Even if the law drives in a slower lane than
technology, initiatives like Datacoup prove that compromises
do not always have to involve attorneys and judges.
Let us think back to our trip to the grocery store, back
to the key lime pie, the diapers in the shopping cart, and the
personal-space-invading tailgater. Now that we have all the
items we need for our pie, it is finally time to head to the
checkout lane and be rid of the pesky follower. All the items are
on the conveyor belt, and the clerk asks to scan your rewards
card. Then, when you get home, you pull up the recipe from the
Food Network website on your iPad. The single grocery store
tailgater morphed into at least two virtual tailgaters with just
a swipe and a click. Even though data brokers commit no
physical intrusion, an intangible and metaphysical intrusion
occurs. The line between physical and virtual space is not just
blurred—it is almost gone completely. It is society’s
responsibility to determine the destiny of this line. Will we
preserve it, or will we let it fade into the technosphere?
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